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abstract
According to epistemic internalists, facts about justication supervene upon one’s
internal reasons for believing certain propositions. Epistemic externalists, on the
other hand, deny this. More specically, externalists think that the supervenience
base of justication isn’t exhausted by one’s internal reasons for believing certain
propositions. In the last decade, the internalism–externalism debate has made its
mark on the epistemology of testimony. The proponent of internalism about the
epistemology of testimony claims that a hearer’s testimonial justication for believ-
ing that p supervenes upon his internal reasons for thinking that the speaker’s tes-
timony that p is true. Recently, however, several objections have been raised
against this view. In this paper, I present an argument providing intuitive support
for internalism about the epistemology of testimony. Moreover, I also defend the
argument against three recent objections offered by Stephen Wright in a couple of
recent papers. The upshot of my discussion is that external conditions do make an
epistemic difference when it comes to our testimonial beliefs, but that they cannot
make any difference with respect to their justicatory status – i.e., they are justi-
cationally irrelevant.
1. internalism and externalism about testimonial justification
Epistemic internalists claim that facts about justication depend upon one’s internal rea-
sons. The traditional way of unpacking the notion of internal reasons is to say that one’s
internal reasons are one’s a priori accessible reasons – where a priori is used in the narrow
or traditional sense that a condition is a priori just in case it doesn’t depend on any of the
sense modalities.1 Thus, the modes of a priori accessibility include not only reection and
reasoning, but also introspection and other cognitive mechanisms with an experiential
aspect. And, in this way, internalists emphasize the epistemic importance of one’s subject-
ive point of view on the world. Epistemic externalists, on the other hand, deny this. More
specically, they deny that only internal or a priori accessible reasons can have justica-
tory relevance. Instead, they think that facts about reliability, factive mental states, or
other conditions that are external to one’s subjective point of view can make a justicatory
difference.
1 For a discussion of the distinction between narrow and broad notions of the a priori, see Casullo (2003:
Ch. 2).
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The internalism–externalism debate has recently made its mark on the epistemology of
testimony. Consider, for example, someone telling you that Sir Arthur Conan Doyle is the
author of Sherlock Holmes, or that the New York Public Library has more than 50 million
items. A signicant number of the beliefs we hold come from assertions like these.2
Assertions present propositions that the speaker represents as being true, and that a hearer
under the right conditions can get knowledge or justied beliefs from. The epistemology of
testimony is about how we should evaluate such beliefs under different conditions.
According to the internalist about testimonial justication, the following thesis is true:
TJ Internalism: A hearer’s testimonial justication for believing that p supervenes upon his internal
reasons for thinking that the speaker’s testimony that p is true.3
TJ internalists thus think that testimonial justication has its primary source in the hearer,
rather than the speaker. Moreover, as formulated above, TJ internalism entails the follow-
ing thesis about the justicatory status of internal duplicates:
Duplicates: If any two hearers are the same with respect to their internal reasons for thinking that
a speaker’s testimony that p is true, then they are the same with respect to testimonial justication
for believing that p.
Externalists about testimonial justication, however, reject TJ internalism, instead
claiming that conditions that are external to the hearer’s subjective point of view can
make a difference with respect to his testimonial justication.4
In this paper, I will argue for TJ internalism and defend it against recent objections.
First, I will present an argument providing intuitive support for the view that only internal
reasons can make a difference with respect to testimonial justication. Having thus moti-
vated TJ internalism, I will defend it against three objections recently offered by Stephen
Wright.5 The upshot of my discussion will be that externalist conditions do make an epi-
stemic difference when it comes to our testimonial beliefs, but that they cannot make any
difference with respect to their justicatory status – i.e., they are justicationally irrelevant.
This is how the paper is structured. Section 2 presents an argument in favor of TJ intern-
alism. Sections 3, 4, and 5 respond to three objections recently offered by Wright. Section 6
comments on Wright’s criticism of Jennifer Lackey, arguing that he either must accept TJ
internalism or an externalist position similar to Lackey’s. Section 7 concludes.
2 I will only focus what Coady (1992) calls natural testimony. Natural testimony, unlike formal testimony
which can be found in, for example, the courtroom, “is to be encountered in such everyday circum-
stances as exhibit the ‘social operations of mind’: giving someone directions to the post ofce, reporting
what happened in an accident, saying that, yes, you have seen a child answering to that description, tell-
ing someone the result of the last race of the last cricket score” (Coady 1992: 38).
3 Proponents of TJ internalism include Fricker (1994, 2006), Fumerton (2006), Lehrer (2006), and
Madison (2016). Moreover, there are different views about what having internal reasons for consider-
ing the speaker’s testimony true amounts to. Some, like Lyons (1997), Adler (2002), and Shogenji
(2006), believe that the reasons must support the general trustworthiness of the testier, while others,
like Fricker (1994, 1995), Malmgren (2006), and Lipton (2007), believe that the reasons must support
the testier’s trustworthiness in the particular case in question.
4 Proponents of TJ externalism include Lackey (2008), Sosa (2010), Faulkner (2011), andWright (2016a, b).
5 Wright (2016a, 2016b) actually offers arguments for externalism about testimonial justication, but for
the present purpose his arguments can be formulated as objections to the argument of this text without
omitting any of his central points.
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2. the argument
I will begin by presenting a scenario that will serve as the basis for an argument for TJ
internalism. The scenario considers a pair of epistemic agents that are duplicates with
respect to their internal reasons, but that differ with respect to external conditions, such
as reliability and truth. And by evaluating the epistemic positions of both agents, the scen-
ario provides the intuitive basis for an inference to the best explanation saying that the
character of justication is epistemically internal. The argument’s general structure is
familiar from the internalism-externalism debate,6 but has had less impact on the epistem-
ology of testimony.7 The scenario I will consider is as follows.
Trustworthy and Untrustworthy College
Consider two ten-year-old epistemic agents, Barry and Larry, who are duplicates with respect to
their internal reasons. Barry and Larry go to different, but subjectively indistinguishable, boarding
schools. Barry goes to Trustworthy College and Larry to Untrustworthy College. Both
Trustworthy College and Untrustworthy College are devoted to teaching its students how things
really are with respect to traditional core subjects, like history and geography. The professors at
the schools try their best to be honest and trustworthy, and they never intend to deceive their stu-
dents. Moreover, both schools teach its students the same things; which is to say that the propos-
itional content of the professors’ testimonies at the two schools are the same. However, the schools
are situated in different environments. In the environment in which Trustworthy College is situ-
ated, the propositional content of the professors’ testimonies almost always turn out to be true.
But in the environment in which Untrustworthy College is situated, the propositional content of
the professors’ testimonies usually turn out to be false. As a consequence, most of Barry’s testimo-
nial beliefs are true, whereas most of Larry’s testimonial beliefs are false. However, despite the dif-
ference in their track records, the professors at the two schools seem to be, from the students’
subjective point of view, equally trustworthy; they are all regarded as knowledgeable and well-
informed with respect to their respective areas of expertise.
Now, let’s evaluate Barry and Larry’s epistemic positions. First, it is clear that there is a
difference between them. Whereas Barry’s testimonial beliefs are highly reliable and
almost all true, Larry’s testimonial beliefs are generally unreliable. When Barry forms
beliefs based on the testimonies of his professors, his beliefs represent his environment
in a truth-conducive manner. But when Larry does the same, his beliefs usually misrepre-
sent his environment. Following a recent trend in epistemology, we can dene epistemic
entitlement as a condition that (primarily) turns on the reliability or truth-conduciveness
of one’s doxastic dispositions in one’s normal environment.8 A natural way of conceptu-
alizing the difference between Barry and Larry’s epistemic positions is then to say that
Barry’s beliefs are entitled, whereas Larry’s beliefs either are entitled to a much lower
degree or, even worse, not entitled at all.
A second difference between Barry and Larry is that Barry appears to get a lot of
knowledge by relying on the testimonies of his professors. The professors at
Trustworthy College undoubtedly know a lot about their respective areas of expertise.
And the internal reasons Barry has for trusting his professors appear to facilitate
6 The locus classicus being Lehrer and Cohen’s (1983) New Evil Demon Problem for reliabilism.
7 A notable exception is Gerken (2013).
8 See, e.g., Burge (2003), Graham (2010), and Gerken (2013).
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transmission of much of this knowledge, via their testimonies, to him. Larry, on the other
hand, appears to get very little knowledge by relying on the testimonies of his professors –
even when what they say actually turns out to be true. The professors at Untrustworthy
College are simply too unreliable and insensitive with respect to the facts about their
(so-called) areas of expertise. Following Alvin Plantinga (1993), we can dene epistemic
warrant as the condition(s) that turns true belief into knowledge.9 Another natural way
of conceptualizing the difference between Barry and Larry’s epistemic positions is then
to say that Barry’s beliefs (often) are warranted, whereas Larry’s beliefs usually aren’t.
However, despite the differences in their epistemic positions, there also seems to be
something they have in common that speaks in favor of them. Both Barry and Larry’s tes-
timonial beliefs are supported by their internal reasons, and, as a consequence, they
appear to be equally justied. After all, as far as the students are concerned, the schools
are indistinguishable in all the relevant ways. More specically, from the students’ per-
spective, the professors at Untrustworthy College are no less trustworthy than the profes-
sors at Trustworthy College. And since the apparent trustworthiness of the professors at
Trustworthy College seems to justify their students’ testimonial beliefs, so does the appar-
ent trustworthiness of the professors at Untrustworthy College seem to justify their stu-
dents’ testimonial beliefs. Indeed, despite the differences in entitlement and warrant, it
seems that the justicatory status of Barry and Larry’s testimonial beliefs are the same
as long as we hold xed their internal reasons. And the best explanation for why this
should be so is that the facts about which propositions one has testimonial justication
to believe, and also the degree to which one has testimonial justication to believe
them, supervene upon one’s internal reasons.10 By abductive reasoning we can therefore
conclude that TJ internalism is true.
To further support this argument, consider a similar scenario, but where Barry is trans-
ported from Trustworthy College to Untrustworthy College in the middle of the night
while he is fast asleep. Unbeknown to himself, when Barry wakes up he nds himself at
Untrustworthy College. Moreover, since the two schools are, from the students’ point
of view, indistinguishable, Barry continues to believe that he is at Trustworthy College;
as far as he can tell, there is nothing indicating that he isn’t or that his judgment is com-
promised. However, after a certain amount of time, Untrustworthy College becomes
Barry’s new normal environment.11 As a result, the new (testimonial) beliefs he forms
by relying on the testimonies of his professors are no longer reliable or truth-conducive.
Although his new testimonial beliefs appear to be just as true as his earlier ones, most
of them are in fact false.
Now, it is quite clear that Barry’s new testimonial beliefs, in contrast to his earlier ones,
neither are warranted nor entitled (to the same degree); his doxastic dispositions are sim-
ply not reliable or sensitive enough with respect to the facts about his new environment.
However, his new testimonial beliefs appear to be just as justied as his earlier ones. After
9 Other epistemologists often use warrant as more or less synonymous with justication. However, for the
present purpose, it will be useful to keep the notions separate.
10 Internalists take it to be the best explanation because it is the explanation that is most virtuous. For
example, it is very simple, and it provides a unied explanation that doesn’t only account for the
Trustworthy and Untrustworthy College scenario, but also has the power to generalize to other scen-
arios as well.
11 For more on the notion of one’s normal environment, see Gerken (2013: 543–4).
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all, for all that he, or anyone else in his epistemic position, knows, Barry still nds himself
at Trustworthy College where the professors are trustworthy. So, once again, it appears
that the justicatory status of his testimonial beliefs turns on his internal reasons for
believing that what the professors say is true.
In order to see this more clearly, it is enough to point out that Barry in the second scen-
ario has gone from the same position that he was in in the rst scenario to the position that
Larry was in. Moreover, according to Duplicates, which follows from TJ internalism, all
internal duplicates are justicatory duplicates. And since Barry and Larry are internal
duplicates, the testimonial beliefs Barry acquires at Untrustworthy College are no less jus-
tied than those he acquired at Trustworthy College. TJ Internalism thus appears to pro-
vide a simple and natural – indeed, I claim, the best – explanation for the intuitions elicited
by the scenarios above.
However, scenarios like these and the arguments they support are not without their
critics. In a couple of recent papers, Wright has presented three objections with the pur-
pose of undermining TJ internalism. In the next three sections, I will defend the argument
above against them.12
3. the objection from lack of warrant
The rst two objections have also been responded to by Brent Madison (2016). For that
reason, I will not spend too much time defending my argument against them. However,
since I suspect that many externalists about testimonial justication share some of the con-
cerns that Wright’s rst two objections raise when it comes to TJ internalism, it will be
useful to demonstrate why they fail to undermine it.
Plausibly, there exists some sort of necessary connection between justication and
knowledge.13 According to Wright (2016b: 75), “justication is that which puts someone
in a position to know things.”Without providing us with any more detail, this presumably
means that justication is warrant – i.e., it is whatever condition(s) that is required in
order to turn true belief into knowledge.14 Now, with this claim in place, Wright considers
a couple of scenarios similar to Trustworthy and Untrustworthy College – one of which is
inspired by Frederick Schmitt (1999), and the other being Alvin Goldman’s (1976) Fake
Barns scenario – and argues, as I also did above, that Barry and Larry’s epistemic positions
12 Externalists have offered many different responses to the traditional internalist argument that relies on
intuitions elicited by Lehrer and Cohen’s New Evil Demon Scenario. Although these responses cannot
be ignored, they will not be the focus of this paper. The reason for this is twofold. Firstly, they have
been responded to in detailed manners before (see, e.g., Littlejohn (2012: Introduction); and Egeland
(Forthcoming)); and secondly, I think the more novel externalists responses, like those of Wright,
deserve their own hearing.
13 However, no philosophical position is immune from dissent. For example, Alston (1989) and Foley
(1993) deny that justication is necessary for knowledge.
14 Indeed, this is what Wright appears to have in mind. He makes the statement above just after discuss-
ing Goldman’s (1976) Fake Barns scenario, in which Henry (the person driving in fake barns country)
fails to know that the barn he’s seeing is real. And, as Wright makes clear, it is “in the same way” that
Henry’s true belief that the particular barn he’s looking at is real fails to constitute knowledge that it
also fails to be justied. See Wright (2016b: 75–6). It is for this reason that I think Wright’s position
plausibly can be reconstructed as saying that justication is Plantinga-warrant.
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differ insofar as it is only Barry’s testimonial beliefs that are warranted; that is, it is only he
who is in a position to know that the contents of his professors’ testimonies are true. And
since warrant and justication is the same epistemic property, it therefore follows that only
Barry has testimonial justication for his beliefs – despite the fact that Barry and Larry are
stipulated to be duplicates with respect to their internal reasons. Hence, since Duplicates,
which follows from TJ internalism, is false, so is TJ internalism.
There is, however, a problem with this particular objection. Without providing any
motivation for his claim that justication is warrant, the idea that Barry’s testimonial
beliefs are justied whereas Larry’s aren’t because only Barry’s testimonial beliefs are war-
ranted begs the question against the proponent of TJ internalism. The reason is simply that
Wright assumes, without argument, that justication is an externalist notion (i.e., that it is
the same as warrant).15 But the internalist can of course adopt a different theory of jus-
tication, one that doesn’t presuppose the necessity of any externalist conditions.
Indeed, not only is the internalist free to adopt an alternative view of justication, but
there are also strong reasons for why he shouldn’t adopt Wright’s view. For example,
by claiming that justication is warrant, Wright is committed to the view that justied
true belief is sufcient for knowledge. However, as Madison (2016: 747) rightfully points
out, in the aftermath of Edmund Gettier’s (1963) counterexamples, it is clear that the tri-
partite analysis of knowledge intuitively fails.16 We therefore have good reason to reject
Wright’s claim that justication is warrant, and with it the claim that Barry and Larry dif-
fer in terms of testimonial justication too.
4. the objection from lack of epistemic value
However, according to Wright, responding to the objection from lack of warrant in the
manner above by denying that justication is warrant reveals another problem with TJ
internalism. In the same paper, he tells us that maintaining that Barry and Larry’s testimo-
nial beliefs are equally justied despite their difference in warrant “amounts to a serious
concession from the internalist, however, since it devalues justication, as internalists con-
ceive of it, detaching it from knowledge” (Wright 2016b: 73, fn 10). In other words,
Wright thinks that if we deny that justication is warrant, thereby also denying that jus-
tication, together with true belief, is sufcient for knowledge, justication appears to lose
the epistemic value that we (intuitively) want to accord it. After all, why should we care
more about having justied true beliefs than mere true beliefs if the former isn’t sufcient
for knowledge?
As far as I can see, there is only one reason why one might think that denying Wright’s
view of justication automatically devalues it, and it is as follows. If you are a monist
15 If my reconstruction of Wright position somehow misses its mark, I still think his objection ends up
begging the question insofar as it begins from the assumption that “justication is that which puts
someone in a position to know,” which clearly is an externalist condition.
16 An obvious reply Wright could make is of course that by stipulating that justication is warrant, the
traditional justied true belief analysis of knowledge becomes true since warranted true belief by
denition is sufcient for knowledge. However, a worry with this reply is that it doesn’t really get
at what we want to say that the notion of justication involves. The view under consideration can
thus avoid Gettier cases, but only by trading in our traditional concept of justication for a rather
uninteresting one.
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about epistemic value, thinking that only knowledge is of intrinsic epistemic importance,
then justication might appear to become trivial unless it is sufcient for turning true
belief into knowledge. Then, and only then, does justication have instrumental epistemic
value as a means to knowledge – the only epistemic property that is valuable in and of
itself – or so it might be argued.17
However, there are a couple of problems with this kind of objection. First, the intern-
alist isn’t committed to the view that the value of epistemic justication is exhausted by the
fact that it is a means to knowledge. Alternatively, the internalist can argue that justica-
tion either has instrumental value insofar as it is means to satisfying some other (epistemic)
property besides knowledge, or that it has value in and of itself. And, moreover, both these
views can be found in the literature. Let me give a couple of examples. On the one hand,
Declan Smithies (2015) supports the rst kind of view and argues that justication has
instrumental value insofar as it is means to having beliefs that are stable under rational
reection, and that being able to have beliefs that are stable under rational reection is
the sine qua non of being a person, which is of intrinsic value. On the other hand,
Madison (2017) supports the second kind of view and argues, using Keith Lehrer and
Stewart Cohen’s (1983) New Evil Demon scenario, that we have good reason to believe
that justication is valuable in and of itself, for its own sake. So, in other words, there
is no reason – at least not any that Wright provides us with – why the internalist should
endorse the view that justication only has instrumental value and that this value is
exhausted as a means to knowledge.
Second, another problem with the objection from lack of epistemic value is that it
assumes that the internalist, by denying that justication is warrant, somehow “detaches”
justication from knowledge (in a way that devalues it). But this, however, need not be the
case. The proponent of TJ internalism can afrm that justication is connected with
knowledge because it is a necessary condition of it (cf. Madison 2016: 747–8). Indeed,
not only is this the standard internalist view,18 it also doesn’t devalue justication. As
we saw in the previous paragraph, one can maintain that justication is necessary for
knowledge and also claim that it either is of instrumental value as a means to satisfying
some other (epistemic) property besides knowledge, or that it is of intrinsic epistemic
value. For these two reasons, Wright’s second objection therefore fails to undermine TJ
internalism as it relies on implausible or unmotivated assumptions.19
17 Questions about the value of being in certain epistemic positions are increasingly being discussed by
epistemologists. Here, I simply want to point out the kind of view about the value of justication
that Wright’s objection appears to presuppose. In my response to this objection, I don’t commit myself
to any specic position on the issue, but rather point to a couple of views held by others. For more
detailed discussions of epistemic value, see Haddock et al. (2009).
18 Some, like Poston (n.d.) and McEvoy (2005), claim that internalists are committed to the view that
justication, as they understand it, is necessary for knowledge. Although I cannot think of any intern-
alists who would say that you can have knowledge without justication, it doesn’t seem like something
they’re committed to. For example, an internalist can claim that facts about justication supervene
upon one’s internal reasons, but that whether or not one’s beliefs are justied doesn’t have any bearing
on whether or not they constitute knowledge.
19 Again, if my reconstruction of Wright’s second objection is inaccurate insofar as he doesn’t really think
that justication is Plantinga-warrant (but rather some other externalist condition), I still think that my
response goes through. The internalist can still claim that justication isn’t detached from knowledge
since it is a necessary condition of it, and that justication either is of instrumental value insofar as it is
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5. the objection from circular testimony
The third objection Wright offers does, at least to my mind, pose a much bigger threat to
TJ internalism. In a different paper, Wright (2016a) argues that there are scenarios involv-
ing circular testimony where the internalist is committed to saying that circular testimony,
contrary to intuition, generates justication. And since the intuitions elicited by cases of
circular testimony (sometimes) speak against TJ internalism, the argument from section
2 fails to provide sufcient support for it.
Testimonial chains can be circular. This happens whenever you have an epistemic agent
a, who tells something to another agent b, who then tells that same (or a relevantly simi-
lar) thing to c, who then tells that same (or a relevantly similar) thing to . . . n, who then
tells that same (or a relevantly similar) thing to a. Let’s call this an instance of circular tes-
timony or, more specically, an n-sized circular testimonial chain. Now, Wright thinks
there are cases of circular testimony that threaten TJ internalism. Consider the following
scenario:
CIRCLE
Agatha looks across the street from her house and comes to believe that the building opposite, which
she recognizes as Jesus College, is on re. She telephones her friend Francesca to tell her the news.
Francesca unhesitatingly believes Agatha and then tells this to her friend Anna, though since Anna
does not know the college, Francesca describes the building and its location to Anna who in turn
unhesitatingly texts this information to Stacy. Stacy is friends with Anna and unhesitatingly believes
her. She is also friends with Agatha and realizes that the building in question is Jesus College. Stacy
telephones Agatha and tells her that Jesus College is on re. (Wright 2016a: 2033)
CIRCLE presents us with an instance of circular testimony – or a 4-sized circular tes-
timonial chain – where Agatha hears from Stacy that Jesus College is on re. However,
according to Wright, since Agatha is responsible for both initiating and terminating the
circle, intuitively, she does not receive any testimonial justication for her belief that the
college is on re. Although her belief presumably already is justied by her visual experi-
ence, the fact that Stacy tells her that the college is on re does not further add to the jus-
tication of Agatha’s belief.
Yet, Wright does not think that all cases of circular testimony fail to generate justica-
tion. There must, he thinks, be some other condition that together with the fact that
Agatha both initiates and terminates the circle is sufcient for inhibiting the generation
of testimonial justication. To indicate what this further condition is, he has us consider
the following variation on the rst scenario:
CIRCLE*
Agatha looks across the street from her house and comes to believe that the building opposite,
which she recognizes as Jesus College, is on re. She telephones her friend Francesca to tell her
the news. Francesca reects carefully on the likelihood of Agatha being insincere or mistaken
and having done so, comes to believe what Agatha says and then tells this to her friend Anna,
though since Anna does not know the college, Francesca describes the building and its location
to Anna who in turn considers carefully the possibility of Francesca’s testimony being false before
means to satisfying some other (epistemic) property besides knowledge, or that it has value in and of
itself.
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texting this information to Stacy. Stacy is friends with Anna and carefully considers the plausibility
of Anna’s claim before deciding to believe her. She is also friends with Agatha and realizes that the
house in question is Jesus College. Stacy telephones Agatha and tells her that Jesus College is on
re. (Wright 2016a: 2034)
Intuitively, Wright thinks that Agatha does receive justication from Stacy’s testimony
in CIRCLE* – or at the very least he is open to the possibility. What differentiates the two
scenarios and makes it the case that only the former kind of circular testimony fails to gen-
erate justication is that the listeners in CIRCLE unhesitatingly believe what they’re told.
In CIRCLE*, however, the listeners critically reect on the plausibility of what they hear,
which opens for the possibility that their testimonies can add to the justication of
Agatha’s belief. This is how Wright puts it:
The important difference between the CIRCLE case and the CIRCLE* case is that, in the former,
each of the listeners believes what she is told unhesitatingly, whereas in the latter case, each listener
reects carefully on the plausibility of what the speaker says before coming to believe it. In the
latter case, it might well be plausible to think that the internalist claim that Agatha’s overall jus-
tication can be enhanced at the end of the case might well be the correct one. The idea is that,
since the statement that Jesus College is on re seems plausible to multiple individuals who are
independently using their critical faculties, this might make them sensitive to more error possibil-
ities and this might make it intuitive that there’s additional justication at the end of the chain.
Indeed, this may be the case if just one listener responds by using her critical faculties. (Wright
2016a: 2034)
According to Wright, all cases of circular testimony where the listeners unhesitatingly
believe what they are told therefore fail to generate justication. Thus, CIRCLE, but not
CIRCLE*, is analogous to the following case where a piece of information uncritically is
passed along to an agent:
INSTRUMENTS
Charlie is attempting to monitor the temperature of some liquid in a glass. He is using two instru-
ments to do this. One gives a reading on a screen and the other gives a reading on a gauge. Both
instruments indicate that the temperature of the liquid is 19 °C. Unbeknownst to Charlie, how-
ever, the instruments have been set up in such a way that the screen isn’t connected directly to
the liquid in any way, but just corresponds to what the gauge says. (Wright 2016a: 2036)
In both cases a source of information (Stacy’s testimony in Circle and the screen in
INSTRUMENTS) is dependent on another source (Agatha’s perception in CIRCLE and
the gauge in INSTRUMENTS), and uncritically passes the information to an epistemic
agent. However, since any case of circular testimony where the listeners (or receivers of
information) unhesitatingly (or uncritically) respond to what they are told (or informed
about) fails to generate justication, neither Stacy’s testimony nor the screen does anything
for Agatha or Charlie’s belief.
Now, the reason Wright thinks this is problematic for internalism is that if TJ intern-
alism is true, then Agatha’s belief in CIRCLE does receive justication from Stacy’s testi-
mony. Since Stacy’s testimony adds to Agatha’s internal reasons for thinking that Jesus
College is on re, it should provide testimonial justication to her belief in that propos-
ition. However, intuitively, it does not. Since the listeners in CIRCLE unhesitatingly
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believe what they’re told, Agatha cannot receive justication from Stacy’s testimony.20, 21
I will respond by denying that the CIRCLE scenario makes it intuitively plausible that
Agatha doesn’t receive testimonial justication, instead of failing to receive (or increase)
some other epistemic property. To see how exactly this response goes, consider the
CIRCLE scenario again. If we evaluate Agatha’s epistemic position at the end of the scen-
ario, it is clear that there are several ways in which it is the same or worse than it was at
the beginning of the scenario. For example, on the one hand, her belief that Jesus College
is on re is no more warranted after listening to Stacy’s testimony. If Agatha’s visual
experience somehow fails to put her in a position to know that the school is on re,
then listening to Stacy’s testimony doesn’t all of a sudden put her in a position to know
that it is. Moreover, on the other hand, her belief that Jesus College is on re is no
more entitled after listening to Stacy’s testimony. Quite to the contrary, it might actually
make it less entitled; the reason being that beliefs formed on the basis of visual experiences
might actually be more reliable than beliefs formed on the basis of visual experiences and
circular testimony where the listeners unhesitatingly believe what they hear.22 Indeed,
there appears to be several ways in which Agatha’s epistemic position either stays the
same or worsens in CIRCLE.
However, there is also a way in which her epistemic position appears to improve. After
all, Stacy’s testimony (despite its circular character) does provide Agatha with an (add-
itional) internal reason for believing that Jesus College is on re. And since there is nothing
in the CIRCLE scenario that tells us otherwise, we can account for the presence of this
reason by claiming that it adds to Agatha’s justication. The proponent of TJ internalism
is therefore free to say that the circular testimony in CIRCLE does provide Agatha’s belief
with testimonial justication, but that it fails to confer any warrant or entitlement upon it.
Moreover, the same reply is also available in the INSTRUMENTS scenario. Clearly, the
20 Formulated in this manner, Wright’s objection isn’t, strictly speaking, sound. The reason is that even
though Stacy’s testimony adds to Agatha’s internal reasons or states, it doesn’t follow, according to
internalism, that it provides testimonial justication to her belief in the proposition that Jesus
College is on re. For all that internalism tells us, one’s internal reasons provide the supervenience
base of justication; it does not tell us anything about which internal reasons or states are justication-
conferring. So it is open for the internalist to adopt the position that Stacy’s testimony doesn’t provide
Agatha with the right kind of internal reason/state that would be required if her belief was to become
more justied. However, since I do think that Stacy’s testimony provides Agatha with an internal
justication-conferring reason, I won’t pursue this line of response any further.
21 Wright’s worry can also be raised as an objection to Duplicates. Agatha, as he sees it, doesn’t receive
any justication from Stacy’s testimony. However, the Agatha in CIRCLE* – let’s call her Agatha* –
does (or at the very least might) receive justication from Stacy’s testimony even though they are dupli-
cates with respect to their internal reasons. As Wright points out, this is because the hearers in
CIRCLE* critically reect on the plausibility of what they hear, whereas the hearers in CIRCLE uncrit-
ically accept what they hear. Agatha and Agatha* are therefore alike with respect to internal reasons,
but not alike with respect to testimonial justication. Hence, since Duplicates, which follows from TJ
internalism, is false, so is TJ internalism.
22 In order for this to be the case the frequency with which beliefs based on visual experiences and cir-
cular testimony where the listeners unhesitatingly believe what they’re told turn out to be true must be
lower than the frequency with which beliefs based on visual experiences turn out to be true. We can
easily provide an example where this is the case by imagining a world in which cases of circular tes-
timony where the listeners unhesitatingly believe what they’re told usually result in false beliefs
(regardless of whether or not those beliefs also are based on visual experiences), whereas beliefs
(only) based on visual experiences usually result in true beliefs.
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presence of the screen doesn’t confer any warrant or entitlement upon Charlie’s belief,
even though it does contribute to its justication.
Wright, however, recognizes this response, but thinks that it fails because the intuitions
that CIRCLE elicits primarily are about Agatha’s epistemic position in general, and not
just about justication. This is what he says:
The trouble with this response is that the intuitive support for (1) [that there is no increase in
Agatha’s overall justication] is stronger than the internalist response allows. It might be correct
that there’s no specic intuition about justication that supports the claim that Agatha’s overall
justicatory status isn’t enhanced and the end of the CIRCLE case. But the lack of such a specic
intuition is of no help to internalist theories. When we are more precise about the intuition that
CIRCLE brings about, we see that it is the following:
(1*) Intuitively, there’s no overall improvement in Agatha’s epistemic standing in the CIRCLE
case . . .
The idea is that the intuition in (1*) creates trouble for internalist theories because it implies the
truth of (1). The idea is that (1*) is a more general thesis than (1). (Wright 2016a: 2039)
Of course, Wright is correct when he claims that we do have certain intuitions about
Agatha’s epistemic position. But (1*) is not one of them. Let me elaborate.
First of all, most philosophers agree that Agatha’s epistemic position changes when Stacy
tells her that Jesus College is on re; her testimony gives Agatha another internal reason for
holding her belief. Wright can of course claim that Stacy’s testimony doesn’t change
Agatha’s epistemic position at all. However, Agatha plausibly comes to believe that a friend
whom she considers trustworthy thinks that Jesus College is on re when Stacy tells her that
it is.Moreover, denying that this somehow changes Agatha’s epistemic positionwould seem
to involve a commitment to the view that Agatha’s new belief cannot, in any sense, provide
her with another reason to believe that the school is on re. But this clearly seems to be false.
Even though it might not provide her with an external or objective reason to hold that belief,
it does provide her with an internal or subjective reason.23 So the question is whether or not
this internal reason somehow improves her epistemic position. According to Wright, it
doesn’t. Moreover, this is just an intuition with which everyone should agree, or so he
claims. The problem, however, is that, uncontroversially, there are certain internalist con-
ditions that supervene upon one’s internal reasons and that do improve one’s epistemic pos-
ition. For example, internalists and externalists generally agree that epistemic blamelessness
(or excusability) is an internalist epistemic property.24, 25 If, say, you are in a skeptical scen-
ario where most or all of your beliefs about the external world are false, it can still be the
case that those beliefs are blameless. If your internal reasons indicate that the world is dif-
ferent from how it really is, then you have an excusewhich guarantees that beliefs properly
23 For more on the distinction between objective and subjective reasons for belief, see Sepielli
(Forthcoming).
24 But every rule has its exceptions – at least in the philosophical dialectic. For example, Greco (2005)
and Srinivasan (2015) claim that there are no interesting internalist properties or norms. However,
they face several serious (and, I suspect, insurmountable) objections, the most obvious of which is
that it clearly seems, intuitively speaking, that victims of paradigmatic skeptical scenarios do have
something epistemically positive going for them. Other, more complex objections have also been devel-
oped. See, e.g., Schoeneld (2015).
25 Some internalists think that no sharp distinction can be drawn between justication and blamelessness.
See, e.g., Ginet (1975), Chisholm (1989), and Bonjour (1985).
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based on those reasons are blameless – even though they might be radically unreliable.
What’s more, all else being equal, having blameless beliefs does constitute an epistemic
improvement over having blameworthy beliefs.26 Indeed, a common strategy used by epi-
stemic externalists to argue that intuitions about Lehrer and Cohen’s (1983) New Evil
Demon Scenario fail to support internalism is to explain our dispositions to positively evalu-
ate the victim’s beliefs by saying that they are blameless but unjustied.27 So, in otherwords,
there are internalist epistemic properties that do improve one’s epistemic position, blame-
lessness being a case in point. And given that Stacy’s testimony provides Agatha with
another internal reason for believing that the school is on re, Agatha’s belief does become
blameless to an even greater degree, thereby improving her epistemic position. Hence, (1*)
is false and the motivation for (1) undermined.
In sum, my response to the objection from circular testimony is that cases like CIRCLE
and INSTRUMENTS don’t reveal anything special about testimonial justication, rather
than some other epistemic property. The internalist, in other words, is free to characterize
Agatha as receiving testimonial justication, while failing to receive any entitlement or
warrant. Moreover, as we’ve seen, Wright’s counterargument that
1. Agatha’s epistemic position doesn’t improve in the CIRCLE scenario.
2. If Agatha’s epistemic position doesn’t improve in the CIRCLE scenario, then she
doesn’t receive any testimonial justication.
3. Therefore, Agatha’s doesn’t receive any testimonial justication.
fails since the rst premise is false. Intuitively, there are internalist epistemic conditions,
like blamelessness, that do improve Agatha’s epistemic position. And given that
Wright’s third objection against the argument from section 2 doesn’t succeed, TJ intern-
alism remains well-motivated.
6. wright’s “halfway externalism”
Having offered his objection from circular testimony against TJ internalism, Wright ends
his (2016a) paper by trying to differentiate his views from the wholesale externalism of
26 This claim can of course be contested, but only by failing to recognize or somehow contesting the epi-
stemic force of internal or subjective reasons for belief.
27 See, e.g., Williamson (2007), Littlejohn (2009), and Pritchard (2012). A problem with this objection,
however, is that it fails to recognize the way in which our intuitions about justication are sensitive to a
distinction between beliefs that are false due to perceptual failings and beliefs that are false due to cog-
nitive failings. For example, the victim of the New Evil Demon scenario has beliefs that are false due to
perceptual failings (in the sense that his beliefs fail to adequately represent the environment he is situ-
ated in), but they still seem justied. On the other hand, if we imagine a similar victim but who also is
subject to cognitive failings, like brainwashing or some reason-distorting drug he’s been given, that
makes him unable to form his beliefs by properly basing them on his perceptual evidence, then they
don’t seem justied. However, the beliefs of the second victim are clearly just as blameless as those
of the rst; both of them (let’s stipulate) try their best to respect their evidence. Indeed, the difference
between their epistemic positions seems to be a difference of justication. But this is not something the
proponent of the objection above can acknowledge. As he would have it, both victims have beliefs that
are blamelessly unjustied. For more on this problem, see Pryor (2001), Egeland (Forthcoming), and
Smithies (Forthcoming).
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Jennifer Lackey. Lackey (2008) argues against TJ internalism28 by presenting a scenario
purporting to elicit intuitions to the effect that reliable or truth-conducive testimony is
a necessary condition for testimonial justication.29 Now, if her argument is sound,
then it follows that a listener’s internal reasons alone never are sufcient for justifying
belief in a speaker’s testimony; there is, as she points out, an additional “speaker-
condition” on testimonial justication (Lackey 2008: 150).30 This, however, is highly
problematic according to Wright. If Lackey is correct, then the internalist story is simply
false: having internal reasons are never sufcient for having testimonial justication. But
this, he thinks, amounts to radical skepticism when it comes to the epistemic importance
of internal reasons. Instead, Wright claims that TJ internalism tells a true story about tes-
timonial justication when it comes to certain cases, but that it isn’t the full story:
It [Lackey’s externalism] seems to amount to an endorsement of a wholesale scepticism about a
listener’s reasons in the epistemology of testimony. In the same way that it’s one thing to think
that inductive evidence in epistemology generally might sometimes fail to justify one’s belief,
but another thing to think that they never justify one’s belief, in the epistemology of testimony
28 More specically, she argues against reductionism in the epistemology of testimony. However, since it
is somewhat controversial how we should draw the reductionism/anti-reductionism distinction, and
since internalism clearly also is one of the reductionist views her objection targets, I’ll simply, for
the purpose of convenience, frame it as an objection against TJ internalism.
29 The scenario she presents, entitled NESTED SPEAKER, is as follows:
Fred has known Helen for ve years and, during this time, he has acquired excellent epistemic rea-
sons for believing her to be a highly reliable source of information on a wide range of topics. For
instance, each time she has made a personal or professional recommendation to Fred, her assess-
ment has proven to be accurate; each time she has reported an incident to Fred, her version of the
story has been independently conrmed; each time she has recounted historical information, all of
the major historical texts and gures have fully supported her account, and so on. Yesterday,
Helen told Fred that Pauline, a close friend of hers, is a highly trustworthy person, especially
when it comes to information regarding wild birds. Because of this, Fred unhesitatingly believed
Pauline earlier today when she told him that albatrosses, not condors (as is widely believed),
have the largest wingspan among wild birds. It turns out that while Helen is an epistemically excel-
lent source of information, she was incorrect on this particular occasion: Pauline is, in fact, a
highly incompetent and insincere speaker, especially on the topic of wild birds. Moreover, though
Pauline is correct in her report about albatrosses, she came to hold this belief merely on the basis
of wishful thinking (in order to make her reading of The Rime of the Ancient Mariner more com-
pelling) (Lackey 2008: 149).
Moreover, as she makes clear, the fact that Pauline’s testimony is unreliable prevents Fred from receiving any
justication from it: “For, even though Helen’s testimony provides Fred with excellent positive reasons
for accepting the report in question, Pauline is not only a generally unreliable speaker, but she is also
reporting a belief which, though true, fails to be reliably produced or appropriately truth-conducive.
Because of this, the testimony that Pauline offers to Fred also fails to be reliably produced or appropri-
ately truth-conducive, thereby preventing it from leading to justied or warranted belief for Fred”
(Lackey 2008: 149–50).
30 “What NESTED SPEAKER reveals is that the possession of good positive reasons by a hearer is not
sufcient for accepting a speaker’s testimony with justication or warrant. Why? Because the posses-
sion of positive reasons on behalf of a speaker’s report, even when objectively excellent ones, does not
necessarily put one in contact with testimony that is reliable. There is, then, a further necessary con-
dition for testimonial justication or warrant, one that requires that a speaker’s testimony be reliable
or otherwise truth-conducive” (Lackey 2008: 150). Note how, when it comes to testimonial justica-
tion, this shifts the focus away from the hearer and over to the speaker.
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it is one thing to think that a listener’s reasons might sometimes fail to justify her belief, or that
there must be more to the supervenience base of justication from testimony than these reasons,
but quite another thing to think that they never justify a listener’s belief.
Lackey’s argument . . . yields the conclusion that internalist evidence never justies beliefs based on
testimony. The argument based on CIRCLE doesn’t yield this conclusion. . . . This is why the argu-
ment here is an argument against the idea that the supervenience claim . . . gives a complete
account of justication from testimony (Wright 2016a: 2045).
So, in other words, Wright thinks (i) that Lackey’s wholesale externalism commits her to
skepticism about the epistemic importance of internal reasons, and (ii) that we therefore
should adopt some sort of “halfway externalism,” according to which a hearer’s internal
reasons sometimes, but not always, are sufcient for testimonial justication.
However, there are a couple of reasons why these views are problematic. First, Lackey’s
claim that internal reasons aren’t sufcient for testimonial justication doesn’t commit her
to skepticism about the epistemic importance of such reasons since it can still be the case
that they are necessary for testimonial justication or some other epistemic property. For
example, she can argue that internal reasons are a necessary, but not sufcient, condition
for having testimonially justied beliefs. In that case, internal reasons play a key role in
avoiding skepticism. In addition, just because one thinks that a certain set of states (like
one’s internal reasons) is insufcient for producing certain effects (like a change in
one’s testimonial justication), it doesn’t follow that that set of states is insufcient for
producing any relevant effect (like a change in blamelessness). Thus, Wright’s criticism
of Lackey and her externalist views undermines nothing other than a strawman.
Second, claiming that TJ internalism is correct insofar as internal reasons sometimes
are sufcient for testimonial justication doesn’t only undermine Lackey’s view, but
also appears to undermine Wright’s own “halfway externalism.” To see why this is so,
consider the following passage from the end of his paper:
Unless we claim, however, that [a hearer’s internal] reasons cannot justify beliefs tout court, it is
hard to see how we can maintain Lackey’s claim that they do not justify the listener’s belief in the
NESTED SPEAKER case, or in any other testimony case . . . No such sceptical consequences fol-
low from the argument that I have given here. (Wright 2016a: 2045)
What Wright here says is that unless we claim that wholesale externalism (which really
just is regular externalism) is true, then it is hard to see why the listener’s belief in Lackey’s
scenario, or any other (relevantly similar) scenario, should fail to receive testimonial jus-
tication from his internal reasons.31 Or, in other words, if we either adopt TJ internalism
31 When it comes to the NESTED SPEAKER scenario, the internalist might, as usual, stress the fact that from
Fred’s perspective there is much that speaks in favor of the trustworthiness of Pauline’s testimony and vir-
tually nothing that speaks against it. Even if we were to imagine Fred as an ideally rational agent that
always responds in the most epistemically reasonable manner to the reasons he has, we are still disposed
to say that Fred should believe what Pauline says. Lackey, moreover, appears to offer two responses – one
quite modest and the other rather bold. According to the modest objection, the internalist is right to claim
that Fred’s belief is testimonially justied, but that it fails to satisfy other (externalist) epistemic properties
like warrant and knowledge (Lackey 2008: 150, fn 11). This objection simply concedes that the internalist
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or Wright’s own “halfway externalism,” then none of the scenarios we can come up with
will appear to undermine the view that the listener’s internal reasons in that scenario are
sufcient for testimonial justication. However, if there are no such cases – i.e., no coun-
terexamples – then not only does that undermine Wright’s own objections against the
internalist, it also seems to constitute an argument in favor of TJ internalism. Let me be
more precise.
First, if there are no counterexamples to TJ internalism, then neither his scenario in the
(2016b) paper nor the CIRCLE scenario can provide the intuitive basis for an argument
against it. And, as we’ve seen above, neither of those scenarios appears to provide such a
basis (or so I have argued). Second, if TJ internalism tells a true story about the determi-
nants of testimonial justication, and there aren’t any counterexamples, then we have
good reason to believe that it also is the whole story. The different (internalist or external-
ist) theories of justication on the market all rely, for their support, on intuitions elicited
by various scenarios. Moreover, if only one of these theories – namely, TJ internalism –
plausibly is able to account for all of these intuitions, then, unless there are other theor-
etical considerations that weigh heavier than the intuitions and that count against it,
that theory remains well-motivated. For these reasons, I conclude that Wright’s “halfway
externalism” doesn’t constitute a theoretically viable position, but rather must collapse
into wholesale externalism or internalism about testimonial justication.
7. conclusion
Internalists about the epistemology of testimony claim that a hearer’s testimonial justica-
tion supervenes upon his internal reasons for believing that what the speaker says is true.
This claim, which I’ve called TJ internalism, is not without its critics. In this paper, I have
argued in favor of TJ internalism and responded to three recent objections raised by
Wright. The upshot of my discussion is that TJ internalism remains as plausible as ever:
testimonial justication does supervene upon one’s internal reasons. However, the externalist
is right to claim that not all epistemic properties are internal. As we have seen, epistemic
agents who are duplicates with respect to their internal reasons often do differ with
respect to properties like warrant or entitlement. Yet, although this difference often
is of great epistemic importance, it does not undermine internalism in the epistemology
of testimony.
Moreover, I’ve also suggested that one shouldn’t try to balance between internalism
and externalism about testimonial justication: the ground in-between the positions is
simply too narrow (or perhaps not there at all). For simplicity’s sake, we should expect
the set of internal reasons to either be a sufcient supervenience base for testimonial jus-
tication or not, rather than believing its character to be multiform and changing on a case
by case basis.32
is victorious. The bold objection, on the other hand, says that both internalists and externalists are com-
mitted to the view that justication is reliable or truth-conducive, and that Fred’s belief therefore will be
unjustied on both kinds of view (Lackey 2008: 151–2). This objection, however, clearly misrepresents the
internalist position (which need not impose a reliability condition on justication), and thus ultimately fails
to engage with the internalist response to NESTED SPEAKER.
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